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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
HOBERT T. OTTLEY,
Plaintiff Mtd Appellant,
-vs.LOIS R. HILL,

Case
No.11112

Def endarnt an.d Respondent.

Respondent's Petition for Rehearing and
Brief in Support Thereof

PETITION FOR REHEARING
Respondent, Lois R. Hill, respectfully petitions the
Court for a rehearing and reargu.ment of the above
entitled case upon the following grounds:

POINT I
1'he Court's decision disregards the precise issue
prrsented by respondent for consideration on appeal,
Yiz., whether the proceeds of various insurance policies,
uwlcr which a deceased minor child is an insured, for
1

hospital, medical and burial expenses, constitutes an
estate of said minor.
POINT II
The Court's decision disregards long es ta blishod decisional law to the effect that before appellant may re
cover for hospital, medical and burial expenses in a
wrongful death action it must be shown that the estate
of decedent is insolvement and unable to pay such expenses and that appellant has paid them or entered into
a legally enforceable obligation to do so.
WHEREFORE, respondent prays that the judgment and opinion of the Court be recalled and a reargument he permitted of the entire case.
A brief in support of this position is filed herewith.
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
CARMAN E. KIPP, EsQ.
D. GARY CHRISTIAN, EsQ.
520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondent
D. Gary Chridian hereby certifies that he is attorney for respondent petitioner herein, and that in his
opinion there is good cause to believe the decision of the
Court is erroneous and that the case should be reheard
and reargued, as prayed for in said petition.

-

~

Dated this ___,':)~Jn-

dt

/J"'-~1::1~1 PEI\.

of~'- 1968.
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BRIEF IN SUP'PORT OF
PETITION FOR REHEARING
POINT I
THE COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS
THE PRECISE ISSUE PRESENTED BY RESPONDENT FOR CONSIDERATION ON APPEAL, VIZ., WHETHER THE PROCEEDS OF
VARIOUS INSURANCE POLICIES, UNDER
WHICH A DECEASED MINOR CHILD IS AN
INSURED FOR HOSPITAL, MEDICAL AND
BURIAL EPENSES, CONSTITUTES AN ESTA TE OF SAID MINOR.
At the time of the death of Trent Lee Ottley, the deceased minor child of plaintiff, three policies of insurance
\H're in force and effect. All of the policies had been
applied for and the premiums thereon paid by plaintiff;
liowen·r, under each of the policies (a Blue Cross policy,
a Blue Shield policy and automobile liability insurance
policy) the deceased minor child was an insured by the
terms thereof. For example, the minor child was a member of the Plan under both the Blue Shield and Blue
Cross policies and as such member was entitled to all
tht> benefits provided for him thereunder. Under the polil':>' of automobile insurance issued by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company to plaintiff, the
minor was an insured and as such, personally entitled to
all thP rights provided for him thereunder. It is unquesti011ed and unquestionable that in the event of the death
nf the insured minor child his personal representative
woukl be entitled to the same rights that the child had
3

while he lived, i.e., payment of the hospital and medieal
expenses resulting from his injury. There can be little
question that the insured 's estate has a right to tlie
benefits under the automobile liability insurance policy
because it provides for payment of the funeral expense's
of the insured. (See Limit of Liability - Coverage ,\1,
automobile liability insurance policy.)
The assets of a decedent's estate may be real, prr.
sonal or equitable. Equitable assets are rights or inter.
ests in either real or personal property requiring the aid
of equity for their subjection, Agee v. Saunders, 12i
Tenn. 680, 157 S.W.64, and are different from legal assets.
Backhouse v. Patton, 5 Pet (U.S.) 160, 8 L.Ed. 82. The
equity of redemption of a mortgage, forfeited in the lire.
time of the mortgagor, is an equitable, and not a legal
asset. So, too, is property subject to a general power of
appointment executed by decedent. 31 Am. Jur. 2d, Executors and Administrators, Sec. 193.
On the granting of Letters Testamentary or of Ad·
ministration, all choses in action in favor of the decedent
that survive his death pass to the executor or administrator, Re Nash's Estate (D. C. Virgin Islands), 255 F.
Supp. 270; Kennedy v. Davis, 171 Ala. 609, 55 So.104;
Ainsworth v. Ca.lifornia Barnk, 119 Cal. 470, 51 P.952;
Biicharn.a;n v. Bucha;na.n, 75 N. J. Eq. 274, 71 A.745. Among
the various choses in action the legal title of which passe 3
to the executor or administrator are notes, Cooper v.
Hayward, 71Minn.174, 74 N.W.152; McBride v. Vance,
73 Ohio St. 258, 76 N.E. 436; and other promises to pay
money, Re Nash's Estate, Supra; Millard v. Brayton,
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177 J\1 ass. 533, 59 N .E. 436; or judgments, indebtedness
of clistributees, and rights to damage for the injury to
property where the cause of action accrued in the lifetime of the testator or intestate. 31 Am. Jur. 2d op. cit.
Hee. 198.

The proceeds of a life insurance policy made payable
to a named beneficiary are not assets of the estate of the
insnn:d, but belong to the beneficiary under the policy;
however, it is generally held that where a policy is payahle tc the insured or his executor, administrator, assigns
or legal representatives, without designation of other
beneficiaries, the proceeds thereof are payable to the
rstat0 of the decedent insured and such proceeds constitute general assets of the estate. 31 Am. Jur, op. cit.
Sec. 200.

In the instant case the facts show that plaintiff applied for and received policies of insurance providing for
medical, hospital and burial expenses for himself and
his family. Plaintiff paid the premiums on the policies
hut in each case not only the deceased minor child, Trent
Lee Ottley, but plaintiff's wife and each of his children,
\\'ere insureds in their own right under each of the poliries. The only thing required for them to remain insureds
WaR that plaintiff pay the premium on each policy when it
hecan:i.e due, which he did. The minor in question then
was an insured under the terms of and pursuant to three
third party beneficiary contracts.
The rule of law in almost all American jurisdictio11s is that a third person may, in his own right and

5

name, enforce a promise made for his benefit even thou~di
he is a stranger both to the contract and to the considrrn
tion. It is not necessary that any consideration mon
from the third party and it is enough if there is sufficient
consideration between the parties who make the agree.
ment for the third party. 17 Am. Jur. 2d Contract~,
Sec. 302.
H is generally held that where two persons make a
contract for the benefit of a third person, by which !lit
promisor agrees to perform a specific obligation which
the promisee owed to such third person, who is showu by
the contract to be its intended beneficiary, the third per
son may maintain a suit or action directly against the
promisor to enforce the contract. Phez Co. v. Salem
Fruit Union, 103 Ore. 514, 201 P.222 reh. den. 103 Orr.
547, 205 P.970.
It is clear that the purpose usually mon11g the
promisee to exact the provision from the promisor is to
relieve himself of a debt or a duty, rather than to confer
a benefit upon the third person, but nevertheless, according to most courts, the fact that performance of the contract would benefit the promisee in addition to the third
person does not preclude the third person from enforcing
the contract. Fidelity and D. Co. v. Rainer, 220 Ala.
262, 125 So.55; Carson Pirie Scott & Co. 1.:. Parrett, 346
Ill. 252, 178 N.E.498; Ochs v. M. J. Carnahan Co., 42 Ind.
App. 157, 76 N.E.788, 80 N.E.163; See also TYillisto11.
Contracts 3d Ed. Secs. 361, 378 and 81 ALR 1286, 1288:
148 ALR 359.
6

Addressing itself to the question of a child as the
Jwueficiary to a contract between two other parties, 17
Am. J11r. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 310, states in part as
follows:

In some American decisions the early English
cases have been cited in support of the proposition that near relationship, such as that existing
between father and child, may be taken to supply
the place of a strictly legal right in the third person. 8 On this view, moreover, seems to be founded the rule that the privilege of naming a child
may be waived by its parents and bestowed upon
another; and when so bestowed in a contract with
a third person for the benefit of the child, it rests
on such privity between the parent and child as
to enable the child to ratify the transaction and
enforce the contract, 9 although the child's right to
enforce the contract may be sustained on the
ground that it has an interest in the name which
it shall bear analogous to the interest which a
child has in its own services. 10 More broadly, it
has been held that a child may recover in his own
name where a promise is made to a near relative
of the child as the child's agent, for the benefit of
the child, and upon a consideration which virtually affects the welfare and interest of the child
himself, so that the consideration may be said to
move in part from the child. 11
As the Court said in its opinion in this case, "it was
the duty of the plaintiff to support his son, if he is able
to do RO, and that duty is imposed by Statute in this
State. The duty of support includes the duty of furnishing medical care and treatment." It is obvious, however,
from the law cited herein, that plaintiff-appellant can

7

enter into a contract with another to relieve himself of
the duty imposed on him, viz., he may take out a Blue
Cross, Blue Shield and automobile liability insurance pol.
icy whereby the various companies agree to pay any hos.
pital, medical and burial expenses that might relate to hi 8
minor child, Trent Lee Ottley. This, of course, is exactly
what plaintiff did. There is also no question that thr
said, Trent Lee Ottley, or his estate could enforce the
obligation to pay for such medical, hospital and burial
expenses as imposed on the insurance companies under
the various policies.
The rights of the deceased minor child are then a11
asset of his estate out of which hospital, medical and
burial expenses must be paid, if the estate is able to pay
them. In the instant case the value of this particular
asset of the decedent's estate was sufficient to pay in full
the items of expenses referred to. Hence, plaintiff
should not be entitled to recover those items as damage~
against defendant herein since these amounts have already been paid by decedent's estate or the obligor of
decedent's estate.

8

POINT II
THJD COURT'S DECISION DISREGARDS
LONG ESTABLISHED DECISIONAL LAW
TO THE EFFECT THAT BEFORE APPELLANT MAY RECOVER FOR HOSPITAL,
MEDICAL AND BURIAL EXPENSES IN A
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION IT MUST BE
SHOWN THAT THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT IS INSOLVENT AND UNABLE TO
PAY SUCH EXPENSES AND THAT APPELLANT HAS PAID THEM OR ENTERED
INTO A LEGALLY ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION TO DO SO.
It seems clear that the Court based its decision in
this case on the collateral source rule. Respondent does
not argue with the validity of that rule, but does contend that it is not applicable to the insant case. The
collateral source rule would have application in this case
only if the deceased infant left no estate ; and it is
respondent's contention that decedent did leave an estate
even though it consisted of only a contract right. If, in
fact, the right of the deceased minor child or his perHonal representative to compel payment of the hospital,
medical and burial expenses for his last illness and burial
does constitute an estate then the law as heretofore prescribed by this Court would come into play, thus obviating the applicability of the collateral source rule.
Respondent again cites the following cases in support of is position herein.

Morrision v. Parry, 104 Utah 151, 140 P.2d 772
(Hl4:J) holding that before plaintiff may recover for fu!J

neral expenses in an action under the wrongful death
statute, he must ehow that the estate is insolvent and
unable to pay such funeral expenses, and that plaintiff
or one of the heirs has paid or that he has entered into a
legally enforceable obligation to pay them.

In re Behm's Estate, ______ Utah ------, 213 P.2d 6G7
( 1950) following the rule, established in Morris on Y.
Perry, supra, that from proceeds realized under a claim
for wrongful death, plaintiff husband, was entitled to
recover the amount expended on his wife's last illncs~
and burial where the wife left no estate and the husband
proved that he paid said amount.
The case of Dauzat v. Great American Indem11i(11
Company, et al, 130 So.2d 805 (1961) supports the position taken by respondent both on the argument of this
case on appeal and in its petition for a rehearing of this
matter.
CONCLUSION
The Court's decision which respondent seeks to haYe
reargued and reheard ignores the question presented to
the Court for disposition and disregards decisional law
of thie and other states which logically and necessarily
support respondent's position. As the decision is prrsently constituted it is of no assistance to the trial court
that made the initial ruling of the question presented nor
does it help counsel involved other than to tell counsrl
for plaintiff he can have his money. The real questiou
of whether the contractual obligation of an insurance
10

company to one of its insured 's to pay for his funeral
expenses is an asset of the insured 's estate upon his
death out of which the funeral expenses must be paid
remains unanswered. If so, under the law as presently
constituted in this state, plaintiff cannot recover those
rxpenses from defendant. If not, plaintiff may recover
from defendant.
Upon reflection and upon analysis of the decision
referred to as it relates to prior cases of the Court, the
decision should be recalled, the case reargued and, upon
such event, the judgment of the trial court affirmed.
Respectfully submitted

KIPP AND CHRISTIAN
CARMAN

D.

E.

KIPP

GARY CHRISTIAN

520 Boston Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Defendant
arnd Respondent.
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